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I describe the process of becoming a feminist as a bumpy process.  
Sara Ahmed1  
1. A challenge of teaching feminism  
As teachers of feminism, an obvious aim is to convey to students feminist challenges to 
patriarchy, and the hegemonic status quo. For anyone who has taught feminism, teaching 
these challenges becomes a challenge for teaching itself. It is not merely that feminism is 
as complex, diverse and intellectually challenging as any other difficult area of study – 
which it is – it is the fact that feminism is challenging. It is a challenge to students, to 
how they think, to how they learn, as much as what it is they learn. The intimacy of this 
challenge might be unique in a student’s experience. For some it is a revelation: it is the 
first time that their education speaks to, and about, them. For most people they find 
themselves implicated, in some way or other, in the challenges they are learning about: 
learning feminism can be a difficult, transformative experience which requires that 
students make themselves vulnerable. This is hard for students and teachers alike; it is 
also something that makes teaching and learning about feminism a rewarding perfor- 
mance of its own challenging praxis.  
But for some students, learning about feminism can be a confounding, confusing and 
hostile experience. While likely true, it is too quick and obvious to point out that this is 
because the student is, in some way or other, committed against feminism. After all, one 
can learn something and yet disagree with it. What I want to explore in this article is 
how the content, and the form of that content, of feminist theory makes it difficult to 
even learn – especially for those students already hostile to it. In this article, I want to 
unpick two related ways that feminist theories, and the claims they generate, put pressure 
on the familiar frames of understanding that educational epistemology standardly 
coordinates itself around. Where feminist theory makes critical claims about the world, it 
challenges familiar norms that govern descriptive theory claims. Such critical claims 
effectively describe the world in ways that challenge standard ideas of description as 
such. This challenge is passed on to the student: critical feminist claims can be very 
difficult for the student to understand as intelligible claims, given standard epistemic and 
descriptive norms. In the second part of the article, I extend this analysis by exploring 
how feminist claims often destabilise the very possibility of hegemonic knowledge. 
Using a Wittgen- steinian account of ‘certainty’ helps us to see that feminist claims can 
clash with stu- dents’ sense of self and world. In my experience, this clash can often be 
felt as an immanent dissonance in students’ learning experience.  
I think these particular pressures might be especially acute in the educational context in 
which I work which is primarily an analytic philosophy department. Indeed, I think that 
a consequence of my analysis for teaching and curriculum design is a caution against 
tokenism. It is easy to see learning as formally homogenous, with courses and course 
content being hot-pluggable: a course can be dropped, and a feminist course slotted into 
a curriculum. This is generally how students’ own demands for better diversity are often 
met. However, I think that this overlooks the ways that critical feminist theories may be 
anathema to other parts of a curriculum. That is not to suggest, of course, that we should 
not teach feminism – indeed, perhaps so much the worse for these other modules. What 
we cannot expect, however, is that feminism will just ‘play nicely’! Nor that it is 
immune from the pressures of its educational context. The ways in which feminism may 
clash with other aspects of a curriculum need recognising and teaching within the 
classroom. Otherwise, students might find dissonance in their learning experience, but 
have no way to address and work with it. Moreover, I think being aware of the pressures 
I highlight in this article will help teachers of feminism to articulate its oppositionality in 
hegemonic educational contexts.  
1.1. Two theories . . . worlds apart 
To see how these pressures arise, let us first take Finlayson’s programmatic claim 
concerning the importance of ‘ideology-critique’ to feminism:  
The main task of feminist political philosophy is often construed as the task of working out what 
perfect gender justice requires . . . But [such] endeavours are blind without some form of feminist 
ideology-critique: in order to have any real idea of what ‘gender justice’ might be, we have to 
understand and see through the distortions of thought surrounding ideas of gender, distortions 
which have long served to uphold gender injustice and oppression; and in order to have any clue 
how to realise a society that better lives up to feminist ideals, we have to have some idea of how to 
respond to the forms of thought that impede our progress. (Finlayson 2016, 22)  
To the extent that this is right – and I think it is – ideology-critique must form part of an 
education about feminist philosophy: students must learn to be critical of dominant 
modes of sociocultural ideology, and they must learn to see, and see through, the dis- 
torted self re-presentations of sociocultural ideology through which hegemony simulta- 
neously fantasises itself, and hides behind. It is precisely the issues of distortion, and the 
demands it places on the student, which concern us here.  
To set the issue in relief, consider an anecdotal example from my teaching experience. 
An obvious standard of feminist philosophy concerns theorising the terms ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’, and what their relationship might be. Teaching this material from some kind of 
‘critical’ point of view prompts responses that range from ‘obviously . . . ’, to personal 
epiphany, to a bewilderment that borders on outright hostility.2 I do not need to explain 
the myriad positions involved in teaching these debates. Nevertheless, take Butler’s 
position in Gender Trouble (2006) – clearly a critical view in the relevant sense, and a 
position that surely anyone should at least teach regardless of whether or not they agree 
or disagree. Some students ‘get it’ very quickly – some of those students like the view; 
some do not. What is distinctive, in my teaching experience at least, is how students 
either fail to understand the view or are profoundly hostile to it. Of course, maybe I just 
teach feminism badly; I very much hope that this is not the case! Regardless, the 
standard methods that I employ to motivate, explain and argue for a view – argue to the 
extent that sceptical students can see it as a prima facie tenable position – are 
disproportionately ineffective compared to the teaching of other subjects. To put it 
another way, why are some of my sceptical students more happy to entertain Lewis’ 
view that we should be modal realists – a view that even he admitted is prima facie 
bizarre – but not that ‘gender’ is normatively prior to ‘sex’?3 It is worth briefly surveying 
some theory details to see just how surprising this is. And moreover, because it is in 
some of the details that the anecdote is instructive.  
When teaching modal realism to students, what do I want them to entertain as ten- able? 
In effect, it is a number of claims, or propositions, that the view consists in – arguments 
and justification aside. These include the following strange metaphysical claims: that  
•  􏰀  reality is infinitely more preponderant than what is actually possible;  
 
•  􏰀  actuality is just one, and only one, possible way everything could be;  
 
•  􏰀  reality consists in every possibility;  
 
•  􏰀  possible things do not actually exist, but are yet still real.  
 
When I teach students modal realism, I assume two things: that these are obviously 
baffling things to believe and that it is by no means obvious why anyone would be 
motivated to think this. How and why should anyone believe something so baroque? I 
expect teaching this theory to be an uphill struggle. Lewis himself, the originator of the 
view in its modern form,4 admits it is met with incredulous stares. What always strikes 
me about the claims of modal realism is how much easier they are to say than to 
imagine. Only when this dizzying infinity is tamed and commodified through the 
familiar cur- rency of propositions, rendered homely and transparent in the dream of a 
priori reason- ing, is it possible to even think, let alone believe. Despite its strangeness, 
possible world semantics and logic – if not full-blown modal realism – constitute the 
philosophical frame for many analytic philosophers; it spreads itself over epistemology, 
moral dis- course, counterfactual reasoning in political and historical theory, natural laws 
and natural kinds, to name but a few areas. In other words, this modal world view nests 
the student experience of many philosophy students in Anglophone philosophy depart- 
ments.5 Why is it so compelling? Lewis is honest: it is so theoretically useful within an 
analytic philosophical context. So much about the tolerability of strangeness depends on 
how much one shares a similar view of the problem at hand. If a student has been taught 
to see problems as analytical issues of logical and semantic clarification and 
transparency, certain kinds of strangeness are more easily bracketed.  
Anyway, this article is not about modal realism, nor about whether or not it is a good 
theory. But against all that, for some students at least, Judith Butler’s theory of gender – 
a theory which is after all, at least about the world we actually live in – is a step too far. 
The situation is stark: the proposition it is possible that I may have had a head made of 
tomatoes because a counterpart of me in a ‘distant world’ has a head made of tomatoes is 
a sensical locution worth arguing over; but the claim that ‘gender’ is normatively prior to 
‘sex’ is variously ‘esoteric’, ‘obviously false’, ‘nonsense’, ‘stupid’, ‘ideology’, and/or 
just ‘anti-scientific’. When there is rejection of either theory, it is often invective that is 
dished out on Butler, and disagreement, no matter how emphatic, that is reserved for 
Lewis.  
 
2. A culture of propositions and how claims claim  
You become conscious over time of how things are not what they seem . . . . Sara Ahmed  
I do not believe that these differing responses are insignificant, nor mere accidents of 
student reception and experience. There are many reasons why students are resistant to 
some theories and not others – not least because certain views put pressure on students’ 
implicit or explicit sociopolitical and cultural commitments. The following analysis is 
not intended as any kind of sufficient explanation of the problems that face the teaching 
of feminist theory. Rather, this is an exploration of a nexus of issues involving 
theoretical claims: how they describe the world; how they participate in issues of 
epistemology, and justification; the existential pressures they exert; and how all of this 
becomes a problem for teaching within certain cultural and educational contexts.  
To that end, I explore two related ideas: how the claims of critical feminism challenge 
the way that theories claim, easily confounding student understanding and expectations; 
secondly, that feminist claims challenge the certainties which constitute the forms of life 
within which students make sense of themselves and the world around them. So, while 
Lewis’ theoretical claims are strange, the way that they behave as claims is very stan- 
dard. By contrast, the criticality of feminist theory results in claims that describe the 
world in ways that challenge the everyday norms of description. The result can be 
student confusion. Secondly, Lewis’ modal realism outsources all its strangeness to the 
realm of a priori abstraction – where weird things happen anyway! It leaves the actual 
world pretty much as it is. Actual (sociocultural) reality is not, in principle, any distorted 
or stranger than it appears. By contrast, the criticality of feminist theory transforms the 
lived world in which students make sense of themselves, and the world around them. It 
critiques the appearances of the everyday world as distorted functions of hegemonic 
ideology. Learning feminism theory involves a level of existential jeopardy which is 
immediately felt in student experience. The result can be student hostility.  
To explore how it is that feminist claims might be challenging in ways that even the 
most outlandish claims of analytic metaphysics are not, the discussion needs situating in 
a theoretical and educational context. What are the contexts of which Lewis and Butler 
are exemplar? On the one hand, these very different theories share at least one important 
feature: they are both making claims about the world – no matter how different. How- 
ever, as suggested above, they claim in very different ways. I want to focus on the 
critical norms upon which feminist claims operate; this, I believe, is a significant part of 
the puzzle as to why teaching feminism can be so difficult. However, this is not to 
suggest that feminism is in some way intrinsically challenging to teach. Rather, it is a 
result of a clash between, on the one hand, how it is that critical claims both describe and 
challenge hegemonic representations of the sociocultural world and, on the other, the 
misreading/ misunderstanding of these critical norms in an educational context which 
generally treats theory claims in a very different way to feminism.  
 
2.1. Standpoint epistemology, feminist pedagogy and teaching feminism  
To build my argument, it is useful to see how the issue at hand is distinctive in feminist 
work on pedagogy and epistemology. It is obvious and well known that any critical 
feminism must challenge hegemonic practices in both knowledge-making and education. 
Challenges in each of these domains are at least related to the extent that education 
concerns knowledge. On the one hand, perhaps the most important feminist challenges 
to hegemonic knowledge-making practices come through standpoint epistemology. 
Thanks to work by the likes of Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding and Nancy 
Hartsock, the idea that knowledge is politically neutral, equally available to all, can be 
equally gen- erated by anyone, and is ‘objective’ is now seen as dubious at best.6 What is 
excluded and included as knowledge, who, and on what basis, are admitted as epistemic 
agents, have all been systematically distorted under the racist, classist, sexist, hegemonic 
regimes of discourse and power.  
Standpoint epistemology has, in various complex ways, sought to destabilise the 
dominance of the ‘Western’, White, middle-class, cisgender, heterosexual man as the 
model of epistemic agency par excellence. This supposedly ideal, and idealised, 
‘knower’ who has been taken implicitly or explicitly as the exemplar epistemic agent 
precisely because of his ‘advantages’ – he is ‘well-educated’, ‘fair’, ‘just’, ‘rational’, 
‘civilised’ and so on – has been thoroughly critiqued. The standpoint claim is not only 
that this model is a symptom of the very sociocultural hegemony we should be resisting, 
it is simply false. It is, for example, false to say that White men are best placed, even 
equally placed, to understand racism as those who are the racialised subjects of a racist 
hegemony.7 Conversely, to put the point somewhat simply, the very people who have 
been excluded from hegemonic knowledge-making practices are the very people who 
understand and know its problems best.  
A further significant thread of standpoint epistemology is the destabilisation of cer- tain 
modes and media of knowledge; chief among them is propositional knowledge, its 
techniques and methods of knowledge production. Propositional knowledge is formally 
ill-equipped for generating and communicating vast swathes of knowledge – ‘know- 
how’ being the obvious example. Moreover, propositional knowledge tends to favour 
sociocultural activities reserved for men, and various extensions of patriarchal culture. 
By contrast, ‘knowing how’, as a modality of knowledge-making germane to areas 
determined as ‘feminine’, has been marginalised. As such, alternative modalities of 
epistemology are vital to the expression, exploration and transference of counter- 
hegemonic knowledge.8  
In light of the above brief gloss, it is clear that standpoint epistemology is a crucial force 
in thinking through what a feminist critical pedagogy might look like.9 In rethink- ing the 
form, content and bearers of knowledge, education, as a key medium for the transference 
and communication of knowledge, must be transformed. Driven by the commitments of 
standpoint epistemology, feminist pedagogies are concerned with the problematics of 
decolonising curricula, reconfiguring the textual canon to remove and/or displace 
hegemonic voices, and to make space for marginalised communities: queer voices, 
women of colour, the subaltern.10 In short, what students will be taught, and what a 
feminist education looks like, will be transformed by counter-hegemonic knowledge. 
This will have an effect in classroom structure, politics and performance: those students 
who have been marginalised are more likely to understand, and have deeper insight into 
the material, than their more socioculturally privileged colleagues.  
This latter experience can be somewhat surprising in its own right as some of my 
students have found out. While the men who have taken my gender module have been 
generally respectful, more than one has pointed out that they feel perturbed that ‘they 
don’t seem to be able to participate in the same way as some of the other students’. This 
was put down to the module covering ‘emotive’ issues. I was understanding, but my 
response was to rerun through some of the basics of standpoint epistemology. Further- 
more, apart from objecting to the partitioning off of gender as an ‘emotive’ domain, and 
explaining the problems of this, I also pointed out that feminism produces claims as 
much as any other discipline – if that is what the student is looking for. Moreover, these 
claims are not emotional outbursts, but attempts to capture critical, counter-hegemonic 
descriptions of how the world is. And this is the crucial point for my discussion.  
Something that many of my students struggled with was Monique Wittig’s famous 
counter-hegemonic claim: lesbians are not women (1992, 32). In the epistemological 
register, this is clearly in line with the standpoint claim that sociocultural positionality 
affords epistemic insight. Being a lesbian, Wittig understood that hegemonic discourse 
concerning ‘women’ aggressively excludes her: she is not what is intended by talk of 
‘women’. Her claim articulates this exclusion. But it does much more, because, in some 
obvious sense, lesbians are women. One thing that hegemonic, heteronormative dis- 
course about women does is normatively exclude lesbians, while analytically including 
them. Hence lesbian identity has nowhere to go to make itself visible: it is analytically 
sucked into hegemonic discourse while normatively tabooed within it. The consequence 
is erasure. Hence her claim not only articulates the actual marginalised situation of 
lesbians vis-a`-vis hegemonic ‘women’-talk, it defiantly refuses analytic reassimilation. 
This establishes the lesbian as her own subject, and also her oppositional situation vis-a`- 
vis hegemonic heteronormativity.  
Whatever one makes of Wittig’s claim, I think something very telling happened in its 
reception when I was teaching the claim. I could explain to students all of the above, and 
the students then had a way to parse ‘what is meant’ by Wittig’s claim. But, for some, to 
maintain their understanding, they had to detach this ‘what is meant’ from the pressure 
of the claim describing the world. It seemed to me that the claim was often taken in 
some kind of figurative sense, not the descriptive sense of saying how the world is. 
Why? Because, ‘at the end of the day’, ‘lesbians are not women’ is just obviously false. 
In Hale’s article for Hypatia on Wittig’s claim, it is telling that he cites a student making 
exactly this point: surely if lesbians are anything, they are women (1996, 94–95). It is 
interesting that the student responds to Wittig’s claim as if this standard view had passed 
her by! It shows an amazing lack of credit for her intelligence. But what students seem to 
be struggling with, understandably I might say, is that a claim might actually be aiming 
to describe the world, but in a way very different to the ways that claims are normally 
understood.  
If I say that ‘there is a table in the room’, there had better be a table in the room. If I say 
there is a lesbian in the room, I had better think there is also a woman in the room. These 
are the normal, pre-theoretical, commonsensical ways we think about claims. But 
remember, as Finlayson says, feminism is charged with seeing through the distortions of 
hegemonic ideology.11 What students have to do to grasp a critical theoretical claim, if 
they do not already see the distortions of hegemony, is to perform a profound act of 
political imagination12: they have to see that a counter-hegemonic claim describes a way 
sociocultural reality is, not merely beyond how it appears, but in such a way that its 
manifest image turns out to be false and ideological. Simultaneously, it requires the 
student to see how the actual fabric of sociocultural reality might be otherwise than it 
appears under hegemonic configurations – and by implication that it could be otherwise 
still!  
The issue here is not straightforwardly a point of standpoint epistemology, nor of 
developing a model of feminist pedagogy – although I hope that what I say here is useful 
in both of these domains, and obviously related to them. While these domains are vital 
for helping us with what to teach, how and why understanding might distribute in the 
classroom, how to coordinate the classroom as a political space, there is a crucial 
problem left over. When teaching feminist theories, how do we do that when their claims 
challenge the norms that standardly coordinate claiming as such? It is quite clear that 
Wittig’s provocation is itself a moment of political resistance to the very norms of 
claiming: she knows what she is saying seems obviously false; that is part of what is at 
stake in the politics of the claim. Given the sorts of experiences I outline in this article, I 
am coming to believe that this is something we need to engage with when teaching 
feminism – especially for students who do not ‘see’ the problem as it were. That is not to 
suggest that teaching feminism collapses into the discussion of claims. However, to the 
extent that feminist theorists make critical claims about social, cultural, political, his- 
torical states of affairs, this problematic concerning the normativity of claiming is a 
problem of teaching feminism that I do not see a way around.  
Wittig’s claim is a kind of description: it talks about the world. But this is a critical 
description, as discussed, mobilised with deep oppositional force to how one might 
ordinarily/hegemonically describe the world. One thing she is doing with her claim is 
making explicit the contingency of the image of sociocultural, political reality, demon- 
strating that reality is at odds with itself, and available for reconfiguration. Those of my 
students who understand the claim in something like a figurative sense want to under- 
stand ‘the point’ while leaving the sociocultural world as it actually is. The claim is 
figuratively true/interesting/plausible/insightful, but still descriptively false because, just 
as accurate claims about tables will necessarily pick out a table, accurate claims about 
lesbians pick out women. It is this norm of manifestly accurate description which 
standardly configures the normative intelligibility of a good claim: true/good/accurate 
(choose your idiom of evaluation) claims describe how things do indeed appear; not in 
ways that they do not appear. What is clear, however, is that the oppositional force arises 
out of a clash with other normative contexts. As such, I now want to consider a little of 
the educational environment in which I teach, and which contributes to the difficulties 
some students find in engaging with critical feminism.  
 2.2. Teaching feminism in a context  
Whenever I teach possible worlds, in order to mitigate its strangeness, I actually draw 
upon the descriptive practices that critical feminism resists. So, when I say something 
true, it represents how things actually appear to be. I do it in the following way, and it is 
very successful. I begin by asking my students something banal: ‘Is it true that I am 
sitting on a chair?’ They are hesitant because it sounds like a trap: I am obviously sitting 
on a chair. I reassure them that this is not a trap – perhaps not quite true! – and to go 
with their pre-theoretical intuitions. Furtive nods ensue. Then I ask why; they point to 
the chair. So, I round up: ‘It’s true that I am sitting on a chair because I am indeed sitting 
on a chair; there’s an object, that makes true this sentence’. Now take the sentence, ‘Had 
my alarm gone off this morning I might not have woken up on time. Is that true?’ More 
nods. But then I point out the clinching problem. If this equally banal, subjunctive 
sentence is obviously true, in virtue of what is true? The other sentence was true because 
there was something actually here that makes it true. But in the subjunctive case, 
precisely because it is talking about non-actual states of affairs, there cannot, it seems, be 
anything that actually makes it true. And yet it clearly is; that is a problem. From this 
set-up it is actually very easy to demonstrate the value and explanatory power of 
possible worlds. Once we accept the metaphysics of modal realism, most everyday 
subjunctive sentences can be easily analysed to represent possible worlds in a way that is 
no more fancy than an empirical sentence represents a chair.  
My students have, for the most part, been inaugurated and encultured within the analytic 
tradition of philosophy. The feminist, post-structuralist and critical theory that I also 
teach is very much an outlier in our curriculum. Analytic philosophy has many 
competing theories about how it is, if at all, that we represent the world in language; how 
these semantic representations are involved in knowing the world. Yet for all the sophis- 
tication and diversity of these theories, the view that when we know something, we do so 
just in case the representation accurately pictures some state of affairs, has not gone 
away.13 It is there in Russell, early Wittgenstein; it is in Lewis’ modal realism. It is 
obviously not a new idea either. It is present, in different ways, in Plato and Aristotle, 
through Ockham, to Locke, Kant and even Berkeley. Propositions, or declarative sen- 
tences, can be true or false. And they are so, as Tarski schematises, in virtue of whatever 
our preferred metaphysical model stipulates – be that empirical sense data, mind- 
dependent appearances or ideas in the mind of God. Formally and technically, it is still 
common to think in philosophy that true semantic representations picture what they 
represent. The ‘common sense’ corollary is: when we speak truthfully, we say exactly 
how things are.14  
To that end, the propositional form of the declarative sentence is still the primary 
medium for codifying factive, descriptive and empirical states of affairs. As such the 
propositional form is also the primary theoretical medium for expressing ‘how things 
are’ for a theory, however it is that anyone wishes to theorise this codification. This 
means that the teaching of feminism cannot really overcome the effects of its critical 
claims looking just like their counterpart propositional claims in non-critical domains. 
So, on the one hand, both my students and I rely on the standard norms of claiming to 
teach much of the material on the curriculum, and then we have to destabilise those 
norms in the feminist classroom. If we do not recognise this deep discrepancy in the 
meaningfulness of theoretical claims being taught across different modules, and nego- 
tiate that discrepancy as part of the content of feminist criticality, it is unsurprising that 
students will be at a loss when trying to ‘get their heads around’ counter-hegemonic 
provocations.  
2.3. Games of justification  
It is worth noting that differences in norms of description become problems of justifi- 
cation for both student and teacher alike. When I offer justification for Lewis’ view, its 
strangeness is, in a strange way, no hindrance. The theoretical motivation is to describe 
the nature of modal reality; it does so in a way that is deeply empiricist in lineage despite 
its metaphysical extravagances. Possible worlds are objects, and we talk about them just 
as easily as we talk about chairs – chairs that we cannot see. So what needs justification 
is the view itself, which, as with so much analytic metaphysics, is coordinated as issues 
of theory choice: inference to best explanation, parsimony and so on. And even if reality 
turns out to be different than how it appears, it is not the appearance that is transformed, 
but just the explanation of the nature of things that appear as they do. This move in 
certain areas of philosophy is common: the explanation is surprising, but the conclusion 
is familiar. Indeed, analytic metaphysical views often vie for justification by retaining 
the familiarity of the familiar, even when the explanations become increasingly strange.  
Justification becomes far more precarious when justification for the theory requires the 
defamiliarisation of the familiar. When I teach Wittig’s claim, I do not call upon theory 
choice considerations. Justification in terms of coherence, for example, is prima facie 
doomed because of its appearance as a performative contradiction. Critical feminist 
theories do not try to secure adherents based on the utility of theory – although they 
might.15 They are trying to get people to understand the world in a particular way, the 
urgency of which cannot be met through games of theory choice. As I have discussed, 
however, that way is precisely not how things appear under hegemonic configurations of 
sociocultural states of affairs. So one thing I cannot do to justify Wittig’s claim is to 
simply point to the reality that the claim is nevertheless (critically) describing. I think 
students find this understandably odd: Wittig claims lesbians are not women. Students: 
but lesbians are women. Me: yes, but you have to see that the naive/hegemonic appear- 
ance that lesbians are women is false, and that lesbians are not women has critical 
insight. For my analytic students who are paying attention, I will be charged with 
begging the question at this point!  
In Wittig’s claim, there is no independent process of justification which nests under- 
standing. That is not to say that students have to agree with the claim in order to 
appreciate its justifiability. Or, that feminist theory does not engage in justifications. But 
they do have to be able to see how it could justifiably describe reality despite 
sociocultural reality being manifestly at odds with the description. This is not an easy 
task for students – or for anybody for that matter. As is well known, one way that Butler 
tries to justify her view in Gender Trouble is by way of drag, its various expressions and 
the various sociocultural anxieties that surround it. However, this justification is not a 
simple case of pointing at drag. The performativity of gender, made visible under the 
subversive possibilities of drag, needs unpicking, and decoding from the ambiguities of 
drag; queer and resistant forms of drag need teasing apart from heteronormative mas- 
querades which merely perform the performance of drag. As such, critical justification is 
perhaps better captured in the idioms of ‘seeing’ and ‘understanding’. It is not coordi- 
nated by theories skirmishing to describe a neutral object world.  
To that end, I have my students watch and critically engage with films such as Paris is 
Burning (1991) and Tangerine (2015). It is a standard of feminist pedagogy to have 
students encounter different expressions and articulations of sociocultural reality. In the 
case of film, for example, this allows students to see the theory being reworked through 
the problematics of cinematic narrativity, set-design, editing, musical semiotics and so 
on. In other words, seeing and understanding lives lived can re-present both hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic realities in ways that are very difficult to achieve just by dis- 
cussion of theory. But obviously this is not a magic solution to the problem of justifi- 
cation, either.  
For example, I wanted my students to read Jillian Sandell’s excellent analysis of the 
film, ‘Transnational Ways of Seeing: Sexual and National Belonging in Hedwig and the 
Angry Inch’ (2010), alongside the film. Sandell argues that Hedwig’s fractured 
queerness is as much a function of transnational politics as transsexuality. Not only was 
the Berlin Wall a marker of geopolitical division, over which communities were literally 
divided, but Berlin was itself mediated by America’s own transnational nationhood. The 
divi- sions, clashes and cultural material that produce the biopolitical fault lines 
configuring cold-war Berlin serve also to configure the opportunities and foreclosures 
that shape the available forms of gender identity, immigration and sexual expression. 
Hedwig’s body becomes a site of those fissures, etched out through the act of flight from 
Berlin. Her attempt at self-preservation in America is then played out through the dream 
of Amer- ican pop culture, familiar from her childhood, but which was never ‘her own’. 
When the wall went down, her body, which was already an expression of the wall’s 
biopolitical effects, is then set adrift from both home and destination.  
From the discussion of the paper, I had the impression that many of my students did not 
really know what to do with this analysis. They did not disagree, or think that it was 
unjustified, or that it failed to help us understand gender identity. Nor did it really help 
either. Many of them simply seemed perplexed. A plausible explanation for this confu- 
sion does not concern the quality of the analysis, its relevance or my students’ ability. 
Rather, I suspect, for students weaned on a diet of analytic problems of self-identity over 
time, ‘Ship of Theseus’-style paradoxes, and a priori thought-experiments, this mode of 
critical analysis/understanding/justification can seem very strange. To be clear as well, I 
do not want to suggest that this sort of activity was beyond my students. Some of them 
were extremely good at theory, exploring its mediations in critical readings of socio- 
cultural phenomena – some had been waiting for this course throughout their entire 
degree. I hope also that all my students found something new and interesting in these 
different ways to do theory. The point is that the circumstantial challenges of teaching 
feminism can be acute, however. Moreover, it is not the right answer to drop this kind of 
analysis from the course. I do not think you can do feminist theory, and thereby learn 
about it, without this kind of critical hermeneutic work. So, to the extent that critical 
feminist theory gets a place at the table of mainstream curricula, these tensions and 
pressures need acknowledging. This module has since been dropped. However, if I have 
the opportunity to teach it again, or something like it, I think that these problems – how 
theory does, both in terms of claiming and justifying – are issues I would broach expli- 
citly, and at the outset of the course.  
3. Teaching feminism, certainty and existential jeopardies  
[H]ow stories that you are told for your own enjoyment narrow down what is possible, especially, 
but not only, for girls. Sara Ahmed  
The discussion so far revolves around how critical feminist claims confound precisely 
because they are attempting to re-present sociocultural reality away from the distorted 
self-representations of hegemony itself. The way I have analysed these problems, so far, 
revolves around forms of theoretical claims and the intelligibility of claims given wider 
educational contexts. These are, in a sense, somewhat narrow, technical issues about 
epistemology, and their effects in my experience of teaching feminism. I now want to 
turn my attention to a much wider issue, one that has been hinted at in the discussion so 
far, but which needs focus and elaboration. I have focused on situations where students 
do not ‘get’ the theory claim at all, or are deeply hostile to it. One aspect of this 
confusion concerns the intelligibility of the claims, and the critical practices of 
‘justification’. However, perhaps the deeper story about this confusion concerns the 
conditions for the possibility of intelligibility as such. Some students do not ‘see’ what 
feminist claims are getting at precisely because some critical claim is a challenge to the 
life-world in which they make sense of themselves, and the world around them. It is not 
merely that the claim does not seem to describe the world, it is the fact that it is at odds 
with the sociocultural conditions of possibility for description. In other words, critical 
feminist claims chal- lenge student certainty, to use the Wittgensteinian term. In this 
section, I explore the way that critical claims clash with (hegemonic) forms of life, and 
thereby the conditions for the possibility of knowledge production within those frames. I 
reflect on the effects of this challenge to certainty, and the problems that this poses to us 
as teachers of feminism.  
3.1. Devil’s advocate  
When teaching Butler’s Gender Trouble, one of my students responded, with some 
irritation, that this was all just ‘anti-scientific’. I asked him what he meant by this, and he 
responded that the theory contravened scientific fact. I asked him, “Could you give me 
examples?” Perhaps the most standard pre-theoretical view about gender inflected with 
the almost equally familiar stamp of ‘Science’. Given the level of student resistance to 
Butler’s position, I wanted to approach the situation more on his terms, in order to jostle 
loose some possibility of seeing things differently. I pointed out that these did not sound 
much like scientific facts to me. If scientific facts are anything at all, they are surely 
precise, technical and dependent on theory context for their meaning and intellig- ibility. 
To be scientific surely we would need biological detail, for example. We would need 
something on what ‘males’ and ‘females’ are. And then we’d need some (scientific?) 
theory that brings together this ‘biological’ description with gender terms. As expected, 
he wanted to draw upon chromosomal and hormonal detail. These are the scientific facts, 
and we can read off the generalist facts from these specifics. I encour- aged him to look 
up some of these facts. He quickly found out that the science is more complicated than 
he had imagined: chromosomal profiles are not the binary affairs he expected; hormonal 
profiles don’t map between sex and gender in the way that he had assumed. Indeed, there 
are even counter-hegemonic ‘scientific facts’ about sex and gender as we find in the 
work of Anne Fausto-Sterling.16 As such, science too is a much more complicated arena 
of theory and discourse than is often assumed. I then ran Butler’s own argument: if we 
are supposed to be reading off ‘sex’ and thereby ‘gender’ from natural facts, and the 
natural facts turn out not to fit our expectations, we had better not be using sociocultural 
sex and gender norms to normalise the ‘natural’ facts. To do so is plainly circular. Her 
point is well known, there were no natural facts prior to gender in the first place; ‘sex’ is 
already a function of ‘gender’ talk.  
His response was not further argument, but a kind of confused, irritated silence. After the 
seminar, he approached me: ‘You were just playing devil’s advocate, right?’ We 
discussed the issue further. When he realised that I took Butler’s position and argument 
seriously, he left deeply unhappy. I have played over this conversation a number of 
times. What did he want, and expect of me with the comment about devil’s advocate? 
On the one hand, I think he found it very difficult to reconcile the idea that a teacher, 
someone he had shown some respect for in the past, could hold a view so manifestly 
wrong. More than this, I think he was hoping I was going to drop the game, and explain 
to him what was really wrong with Butler’s view. What he needed was help: not just 
some extra tutoring, but support. He was certain Butler was wrong. Indeed she had to be; 
just as for some students, she must be right. But it was also somewhat clear to him that 
he did not have reasons-to-hand as to why it was wrong. He was hoping that I, as the 
teacher, did. I would explain; then it would all make sense again, and he would have 
been right all along.  
No student has ever come up to me to seek reassurance over the structure and nature of 
modal reality. Students come to favour views about modality; they will argue about 
them, maybe even vehemently and passionately. But no student I have come across 
needs Lewis to be wrong. No matter whether or not a student agrees with Lewis, they 
could live with him being either right or wrong. Some views have the luxury of simply 
being right or wrong. Other views are such that students rhetorically situate them as the 
devil’s work, and the academics who write them have effigies of themselves burnt by 
crowds of demonstrators.17 Why is that?  
3.2. Feminist claims, hegemonic descriptions and certainty  
The answer is obviously enormously complex. But part of the answer, I think, lies at the 
hidden heart of epistemology. Many of us are, in a myriad of different ways 
(psychically, economically, politically, etc.), invested in the maintenance of the 
hegemonic status quo. Moreover, these investments are not merely acquired epistemic 
commitments, indexed to beliefs about the world that we take to be true, but are 
constitutive, existential commitments out of which sociocultural forms of living are 
constituted. Hegemony is the dominant form of living in existential and political terms. 
In terms of the intelligibility of the sociocultural world and descriptions of it, one way 
that hegemonic dominance is expressed is by determining the scope of possible 
sociocultural descriptions. Moreover, having outlined what can and cannot be 
intelligibly said, the possibility of description maps, in advance, to the sociocultural 
configurations of hegemony. Feminist claims may contest descriptions that society is 
this way or that. However, feminism very often contests hegemony at a deeper, more 
fundamental level: at the very level of the frame of descriptive intelligibility as such. By 
extension, to the extent that feminist theory claims challenge hegemonic certainties, 
hegemony must preclude those claims as alternate, possible frames for understanding the 
world. Therefore, what counts as a description within a frame of intelligibility, and what 
counts as part of the frame, becomes a contest for control of epistemology, and for the 
possibility of discourse as such. This contest has immediate, and profound, effects for 
students learning feminist theory. It is one thing to take an epistemic risk on some 
description being true or false. It is quite another to have to entertain a claim which 
implicates all that you take certain about yourself, and the sociocultural world which 
frames the sense that the world has. This is the existential risk, as it were, that counter-
hegemonic feminist claims involve.  
To more fully explore this existential dimension of teaching critical feminist claims, I 
think it is very useful to reflect on Wittgensteinian accounts of the epistemology of 
certainty. Wittgenstein argued that not all propositions that appear to describe the world 
are so. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues that some seemingly empirical propositions 
frame knowledge-making practices. These framing – or hinge propositions – are in fact 
certainties. Certainties appear in form and content to be empirical propositions, and 
thereby justifiable empirically: we want to evaluate them by looking at the world, as it 
were, and seeing if they accurately represent it. However, Wittgenstein argues that 
certainties frame the intelligibility of the empirical world (1969, §358). Certainties 
constitute the forms of living, and the conditions of intelligibility for an empirical 
proposition; hinge propositions delimit the domain of the empirical, and the game of 
empirical justification within which epistemology standardly takes place (§162). As a 
result, certainties determine the scope of epistemic possibility for any empirical proposi- 
tion: it is possible, in terms of a posteriori enquiry, that it is not raining; so the proposi- 
tion that it is raining is empirical. However, it is not possible, in the relevant epistemic 
sense, that I can stand on the sun and so this proposition is a certainty that frames the 
intelligibility of other empirical propositions (§117). We do not do empirical research to 
find out if I have told the truth about not having stood on the sun; the claim that ‘I have 
not stood on the sun’ is the gratuitous expression that I can coordinate myself, practically 
and communicatively, within the particular ‘life-world’ in which I live. Indeed, we can 
identify a certainty if its articulation is met with confusion rather than empirical inquiry.  
I have suggested that feminist claims seem to describe the world, just as certainties do. 
But we can see that in both cases, the norms that govern both feminist claims and 
certainties are radically different to the epistemic norms that standardly govern and 
coordinate describing claims such as ‘it is raining’. What I now want to explore is the 
idea that critical feminist claims contest hegemonic certainties for the majority of people 
within dominant forms of living. But what the feminist is trying to do is wrest that 
certainty out of its framing role and into a position of epistemic contestability without  it 
thereby just becoming an empirical claim in the process. Hence feminist claims are 
simultaneously hegemonic certainties for some, and for critical feminists radical modes 
of description that destabilise certainties, and the empirical configurations of the world 
made possible by those certainties.18 The critical claims of feminist theories therefore 
run a tightrope through the standard epistemic structures and norms which we standardly 
deploy to describe and understand the world around us.  
Feminist claims are existential: they implicate, contest and configure the meaningful- 
ness for living in any particular life-world. It seems plausible that they therefore take aim 
at Wittgenstein’s certainties while operating within the domain of what is usually/hege- 
monically taken to be empirical, for example, gender, class, race and so on. In a hege- 
monic distribution of the empirical and the certain, the proposition ‘I know that he is a 
man’ is empirical, and ‘there are two sexes’ is a certainty. Without Wittgenstein’s 
insight, the latter proposition is standardly treated as empirical while occupying the 
space of certainty. That is, the proposition is treated as though empirical, and thereby 
able to be either true or false, while its truth is taken to be obvious beyond empirical 
doubt. If hegemony determines both the frame within which lives are made intelligible, 
as well as the form and content of empirical material out of which possible descriptions 
of the world are composed, then hegemony takes on the aura of inevitability.  
I am inclined to think that Wittgenstein is right that certainties frame the possibility of 
intelligibility and epistemology as such. The issue of certainty is therefore a deep prob- 
lem for feminist theory: feminism wants to take as contingent, and contest, what hege- 
mony takes as certain. But given that certainty is the frame in which such contestations 
take place, feminist theory is always already undermined by hegemonic certainty. In my 
view, no critique, feminist or otherwise, can ever drill all the way through a form of life. 
Call this the existential limitations of critique. However, even as feminism is itself 
existentially situated and limited – which is another way of saying that critique is always 
nested within a form of life, and never a critical view from nowhere19 – it takes aim at 
the forms of life which sustain its own possibility.20 In part this is achieved by rethinking 
at least some of the sedimented certainties of sociocultural material. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein points out that forms of life are always in processes of (slow) change (§97). 
He provides us with the appropriately conservative image of a riverbed undergoing 
gentle erosions and reconstitutions; change in forms of life as functional effects of lives 
being lived collec- tively. Contrary to this image of ecological conservatism, feminism is 
radical: it is always an untimely intervention into forms of living21; it is a drill upon the 
bed of certainty.  
As such, feminist claims are literally and figuratively, epistemically and existentially 
disturbing. Take the hegemonic certainty that ‘there are two sexes’. What are the con- 
sequences of reading this claim critically rather something empirical or certain? Basi- 
cally, it involves reading it as both hegemonically true, but where that truth is an index 
of hegemonic distortion. Butler knows that it is taken to be a hegemonic certainty, but 
rather than asking a naive empirical question: true in virtue of what; she asks how is it 
true? It is not true on some normatively neutral, naturalistic/empirical basis; rather, the 
way this claim is true is according to the configurations of sociocultural and historical 
phenomena that underwrite the form of the hegemonic life-world. She now has the 
material to tease out dialectical contradiction: the veneer of natural fact upon which the 
proposition is supposedly based becomes an index of its falsity also. It is true that ‘there 
are two sexes’, but not because of the fact of two sexes, but because hegemonic reality is 
configured such that ‘there are two sexes’. Hence Butler’s crucial insight over the 
dangerous precarity of hegemonic certainty: the very place that hegemony wants us to 
look for supposedly normatively neutral ‘facts about sex’, that is, the material world, is 
the very place hegemony cannot afford for us to look without drawing attention to its 
own normative biases.  
3.3. Student certainty ( . . . and students’ boyfriends’ certainty)  
This analysis of the relationship of feminist claims to hegemonic certainties and ‘facts’ 
has useful implications for better understanding the complexities that surround teaching 
feminist theory. On the one hand, it helps us to better understand the dynamics and 
consequences of the analysis of section 2. In his memorable example of teaching the 
child, Wittgenstein points out that when teaching children, often they are not given 
reasons (§374). ‘This is a “table”’. ‘Why?’ asks the child. Wittgenstein reminds us of the 
adult response: ‘There is no “why”; I am telling you that “this is a table”’. The adult is 
not reasoning with the child, she is inaugurating the child into a form of life; telling her 
how things are. ‘This is a boy. You are not a boy; you are a girl’. ‘Why?’ Because, 
ultimately, that is how things are. Whatever reasons are given along the way, they will 
bottom out somewhere in the certainties which always, and already, delimit ‘how things 
are’. There is nothing to say about those certainties other than to inhabit them; there are 
no reasons hiding behind them. What Wittig’s provocative claim does is reconfigure the 
naturalistic rhetoric of ‘how things are’. She reminds us that what the adult really means 
is: ‘this is how things are for us’ where ‘us’ stands for the unspoken standpoint of the 
hegemonic majority. Hiding hegemonic certainty under the guise of ‘naturalistic fact’ is 
where the distortions of heteronormativity reside. As such, the justification of critical 
claims discussed above becomes a problem of wrestling with sociocultural certainty. It is 
a way of showing and analysing the social world in a way that it is both familiar, and yet 
resistant to hegemony’s own self-marketed image as both given naturally, and necessary. 
These problems of certainty are problems for students both inside and outside the 
classroom.  
For the sceptical student, what they take as a certainty is ‘out of play’ from an epistemic 
point of view. Even saying ‘I know that I am a man’ is already too much (§538). As 
Wittgenstein points out, to say that I know that p, is to entertain the possibility of being 
able to be wrong about p. If, however, I do not even know how I could be wrong about 
p, then I am certain of it. I think this helps explain the impasse that I reached with my 
student over Butler. This is simultaneously the deeper implication of standpoint 
epistemology: standpoints are functions of positions in forms of living relative to hege- 
mony. While the standpoints of marginalised communities may emerge from within the 
sprawl of hegemonic cultures, those that are still positioned differently to those who 
more or less live hegemonic lives. For the distribution of facts and certainties, ‘gender’ 
and ‘sex’ as such are not even supposed to be ‘knowledge’; we should not be talking 
about them in epistemic terms; they are givens. To the extent that we engage with them 
at all, we do so on the basis that they are demonstrably supported by scientific fact – 
where this idealised ‘science’ trumps all other modes of description available. My 
attempt to reason with him involves treating ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ as knowledge, and 
therefore, as contestable; this is precisely what ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ is not for him, given 
the way that he has been encultured to understand himself and the world around him.  
I think if I could try again, it would be to articulate the certainty of the certainty, and 
work from there. Acknowledging certainty, acknowledging that we are all certain of 
some things and acknowledging that it is scary for any of us to question that of which we 
are certain, might have been a better place to start. Moving forward, however, there can 
be no magic formula for how to teach feminism in this situation. There can be no general 
method because the way in which individual students experience, and inhabit the world 
in which they live, will particularise the conditions under which the certainty of certain- 
ties can be suspended. How a certainty may be revealed as such – and thereby as a 
contingent frame for a form of life – will very much depend on the student, and how 
their own particular circumstances situate the membrane that separates the empirical 
from the certain. Their specific experiences will determine how hegemonic reality will 
appear as either certain or contestable; these specifics will further determine whether 
there are some particular certainties that could be jostled loose from their sedimentations 
as certainty into contestable discussion. Indeed, it is also possible that for some students, 
the life-world constituting ‘facts’ of hegemony are, and will remain, certain. Whatever 
happens, contesting certainties, as feminist theories do, involves serious existential 
jeopardy for students.  
Yet, as a final point, all of this discussion has so far discussed student experience as 
something that they do by themselves, and for themselves. This is obviously not the 
case. The very issue of certainties as indices of forms of living already expresses the 
imma- nence of a wider sociocultural frame for individual experience. Checking in with 
stu- dents about their reading, one student was frowning. Butler again ( . . . I do teach 
other things on this course, by the way, but it is Butler that frustrates the most)! Her 
boyfriend was complaining about the hubris of academics who talk about people in ways 
that they themselves cannot understand. He had concluded from this that Butler must be 
talking nonsense. I pointed out that scientists talk about us, and about the world around 
us, in technical ways that we, as lay people, might not understand. But we do not take 
that as a measure of the truth of what they say. I was aware though that this is not what 
the student’s boyfriend was getting at. He was voicing similar frustrations to my own 
student above. The point of this final anecdote is to acknowledge the pressure that 
students feel both from within the classroom and from outside of it – pressures which 
squeeze from both directions as it were. Students have to negotiate not only the 
existential disturbances of learning feminist theory, but also how those disturbances 
tremor beyond the class- room. These may be shocks felt in their personal relationships 
with friends, partners and family. Indeed, this is a hegemonic beyond which most likely 
undervalues, resists and undermines their experiences within the feminist classroom.  
4. Concluding remarks  
I have discussed at some length how teaching feminism is involved in the problematics 
of critically describing sociocultural states of affairs. The criticality of feminist claims 
means that they describe in ways that are often confusing for students; justification 
involves further exploration and theorising of these descriptions. As such, justification 
can emphasise rather than relieve the pressures felt due to the difficulties of theory. 
These issues are rendered even more complex by the fact that feminism is often 
attacking certainties about the world. Yet these are never abstract problems but problems 
in the classroom: they are problems mediated by a student’s learning experience, 
sociocultural context, curriculum design and how feminist modules are situated 
alongside other areas of study.  
Reflecting on my experiences, and in the writing of this article, I am increasingly con- 
vinced that acknowledging the practice of feminist theory, and how it radically 
transforms the practice of learning, is crucial content in a feminist class. Moreover, that 
depending on the context of feminist theory module in a curriculum, the problem of 
educational context will be more or less acute. Regardless, I think that my exploration of 
these issues has far- reaching implications in a liberal educational context. Where 
knowledge and knowledge- making practices are seen as homogenous, enjoying 
equitability across domains of study, feminist theory modules will not slot so easily into 
curricula. Nor is it so easy to fit some critical feminist theory into a module. Of course, I 
am not suggesting that by that feminist theory and modules get left out. Rather, that the 
depth of their challenge be appreciated, and that there is substantial curriculum 
commitment to feminism, and the challenges it poses to students beyond the feminist 
module and its classroom.  
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Notes  
1. All three quotations from Sara Ahmed (2017). https://www.guernicamag.com/sara-ahmed- 
the-personal-is-institutional/.  
 
2. I take an intentionally broad focus as regards ‘critical feminist philosophy/theory’. What 
‘feminist’ ‘philosophy’ might be – its methods and practices – is itself an issue of feminism. 
See, for example, Brown (2005, §6) and Diprose (2000). What I have in mind by talking 
about critical feminism is any feminism that counts as critical theory, broadly constructed. 
That might be operating with a methodology of ‘critique’ such as in the work of Wendy 
Brown, see especially Brown (2005, §1; 2006, 4–5). Furthermore, there are other feminist 
theorists whose work is clearly critical in some relevant sense. See, for example, the likes of 
Butler (2006), Mohanty (1988), through Spivak (1998), to name but a few. That said, I 
appreciate that the tendency for criticality has been critiqued by other feminists – see 
Sedgwick’s powerful reappraisal of (paranoid) ‘critique’ (2003, 144).  
 
3. Lewis (1986, 133); Butler (2006, 10–22).  
 
4. Leibniz is the historical inspiration by arguing that our world was the best of all possible  
worlds (2007, 130).  
 
5. The theories I develop here may seem reminiscent of contemporary Threshold Concept  
theory. Without going into detail about this, I am broadly sympathetic to the ideas of 
transformation and difficulty in this theory. However, there are commitments about 
concepts, discipline structures and a general view of epistemology that I find less 
convincing. As such, the analysis here, I think, stands very much apart from this pedagogy 
in important respects. See Meyer and Land (2005).  
6. Standpoint epistemology is a rich trajectory in feminist thinking, and has been crucial to the 
development and ongoing challenges that women, and other marginalised groups, can levy 
towards hegemonic epistemologies and their effects. For this section, I am drawing upon 
these writers as exemplar in this development while acknowledging that this is a sample. 
See Hill Collins’ (2000, 268) classic analysis of the epistemic status of racialised subjects; 
Harding (1987, 7–10) on standpoint epistemology in the sciences and social sciences; 
Hartsock (1987, 159–64) on the nature of a standpoint. I share Paul Gilroy’s concerns that 
standpoint episte- mology runs the danger of replicating the reification and idealisation of 
subjects and associ- ated knowledges (2002, 53). That said, now is not the place to 
adjudicate over these issues. Moreover, to the extent that standpoint epistemology is relevant 
to this article, I think that such epistemologies are crucial.  
 
7. Thisisnotwithstandingpostcolonialcritiquesofwhogetstodecidewhatknowledgeis,howit is 
produced and what it looks like. See Quijano (2007, 169); Cf. also Dastile and Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni (2013, 110–12). This also concerns hegemonic expressions and language which 
control and determine the intelligibility of epistemic agents – see Oye`wu`m ́ı (2004, 5–7).  
 
8. See, for example, Dalmiya and Alcoff (1993, 221) for ways propositional knowledge is 
privileged over other modalities of knowing, and how that privileges certain activities and 
knowers while marginalising others.  
 
9. Inthisarticle,Iamdrawinguponthetraditionofcriticalpedagogy,growingoutoftheworkof Freire 
(2005), through Giroux (1997, 2011) and Lombardo (2004). I have been particularly 
influenced by the critical reception and mediation of critical pedagogy in the work of bell 
hooks’ feminist pedagogy (1994, 2010).  
 
10. See, for example, Mary Brown and Suzanne De Castell (1993) for one of the first papers to 
explore the relationship between queer theory and pedagogy; Shireen Keyl (2017) for a 
critical analysis and development of pedagogical theory through the lens of subaltern theory.  
 
11. Of course the notion of hegemony is complex and contested; here, I adopt something like 
the view espoused by Laclau (2000, 44–58) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 7–8). Hegemony 
refers to the dominant, normative framework which configures the apparatuses of power that 
con- stitute some society.  
 
12. See Zerilli (2005) for further discussion of the complexities of political imagination and 
feminist thinking.  
 
13. See Russell (1951, 127–29) for a classic view of a fact; and Kirkham (2001, 121–22). Of 
course there are other models of the fact – Tractarian, for example. Rather than any 
particular theory, I am implicitly working with some broad kind of isomorphic, 
correspondence between what is said and how things are.  
 
14. Ithinkaswellthattheseissuesofisomorphismandcorrespondencearesomewhatfancyways of 
talking about ideas that underwrite common sense and pre-theoretical views of truth. As 
such, this ‘saying how things are’ is powerful in and outside the classroom – see hooks 
(2010, 49–50). It is also worth noting that the facts of a theory, is often what is ‘banked’ as 
knowl- edge, see Freire (2005, 72); and what Dewey (1997, 17) critiques in the transference 
theories of education. Needless to say that feminist theories have been traditionally wary of 
facts, correspondence, naive realist truths and their roles in propositional knowledge. Even 
in theories sympathetic to analytic philosophy, there is often a push away from these 
semantic, epistemic and metaphysical commitments; see, for example, Alcoff (1996) and 
Haslanger (2012). For contrast, see Boghossian (2006, 717) for a deeply uncritical repetition 
of corre- spondence about truth and justification in an educational context. He does not even 
acknowl- edge that there are other realisms than the rough epistemic realism he sketches in 
this paper. I have not touched upon Mohanty’s (1990) excellent analysis of liberal epistemic 
practices and their implications for teaching: how facts about ‘the world out there’ tend to 
excuse the knower from their involvement in those ‘facts’ (p. 194), and how epistemic 
agency as such is also structured in an atomistic, individualistic way (p. 199). I take it my 
analysis is at least consistent with these key insights.  
15. I am grateful for Jana Cattien for pointing this out to me. Butler’s performativity theory of 
gender may well be compelling for theory choice issues. While divisive and confounding to 
some, for many it has extraordinary explanatory power.  
 
16. See Fausto-Sterling (1985, §§3 and 7).  
 
17. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/11/13/judith-butler-discusses-being-burned-  
effigy-and-protested-brazil.  
 
18. For a relevant, critical discussion of certainty and feminist foundations, see Zerilli (2005, 
§1).  
 
19. See Mahmood (2013); Adorno (2004, 237); Brown (2013).  
 
20. SeeMarasco(2006,110)andBrown(2006,4–5)onfeministcritiqueanditsowndestabilising  
effects for feminism.  
 
21. See Brown (2005, §1).  
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